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Spiritual Exercises
Nietzsche’s third Untimely Meditation, composed
in 1874, Schopenhauer as Educator (Nietzsche
1983a), reﬂects upon and describes a “spiritual
exercise” not unlike the spiritual exercises of
St. Ignatius of Loyola, detailing tactics and including practical advice. Thus Nietzsche’s “spiritual
exercises” correspond to the traditional practice of
self-cultivation, self-education, characteristic of
the Stoic philosophers but also inﬂuential for the
Hellenistic neo-Platonic tradition, the church
fathers, and St. Augustine, author of De Magistro
and the Confessions. Beyond antiquity, spiritual
exercises refer to a theological practice of selfcultivation and self-discipline. As a classist by
training, Nietzsche notably offered a series of
reﬂections on self-cultivation usually associated
with the phrase he adopted as his own from the
7th Century BCE lyric poet, Pindar: “Become the
one you are!” emphasizing that one only assumes
but does not know oneself and must undertake to
seek to come to know and then and on this basis to
perfect oneself. In this same spirit, Nietzsche’s
Untimely Meditations reﬂect on a project of selfdiscovery and discipline. In particular, Schopenhauer as Educator, illustrates the project of ﬁnding

the ideal educator for oneself: inasmuch as and
ultimately, so Nietzsche writes, education can
only be “self-education” and for the sake of, like
the Stoics, attaining liberation: “your true educators
can only be your liberators.” Here, it is well worth
reviewing Ignatius of Loyola’s (1986) own
Spiritual Exercises. (For a philosophical discussion, in addition to Patrick Aidan Heelan, S. J.
1986, see Antonio de Nicolás’s, articulation of
spiritual technique (1986a). A former Jesuit, with
all the training of the same, de Nicolás’ highly
programmatic rules for the direction of sainthood,
as it were, are detailed in the second and third
chapters of the ﬁrst part of his book, Powers of
Imagining, entitled, respectively, Imagining: Primary Text, Primary Technology (1986b) and
A Text for Reading, A Text for Deciding (1986c)).
Such spiritual exercises or practices as we may
speak of these following Pierre Hadot or Michel
Foucault, correspond to is “the secret” of education in Nietzsche’s essay, Schopenhauer as Educator, the third of his Untimely Meditations, the
ﬁrst three of which were published, seriatim, from
1873 through 1874. (The fourth essay of the
Untimely Meditations, Richard Wagner in Bayreuth would not appear until 1876.) If the second
essay, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History
for Life, has rightly commanded attention, the ﬁrst
essay is especially signiﬁcant if only rarely
discussed in its own right: a diatribe on the theologian and popularizer David Strauss, concerned
with the same theme that occupies Nietzsche in
his second essay, that is, concerning the use of
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historical philology (Strauss popularized the socalled ‘historical’ Jesus) along with the challenges
of popular reception and not less with the question
of an author’s style.
Here in David Strauss, the Confessor and the
Writer (Nietzsche 1983b), Nietzsche begins by
examining the “appeal” of popular appeals as
such, starting with Strauss’s theological philological (or classical) scholarship, as Nietzsche criticizes this, along with his ‘use’ of history, for the
sake of the convention of an historical Jesus, thus
articulating a putatively ‘scientiﬁc’ but in fact
conventionally rather than critically historical
account, drawing on Darwin and Hegel in addition to Schleiermacher and the mechanics of cosmology, including a “philistine” relation to
historical context as indeed to then-contemporary
politics and war.
By contrast with such broadly philological
concerns, Schopenhauer as Educator, offers an
intimate address to the reader, beginning very
nearly as Descartes begins his own Meditations
on First Philosophy, including – recall Hadot’s
references to Pierre Courcelle on Augustine
(Hadot 1995, 50–52) – the trappings of the genre
of “meditation,” talking about travel and distant
lands, as of different peoples, space, and time–all
the ingredients of personal communication.
Thus, we begin with an overall impression
conﬁded by an experienced traveler who confesses to us that most people in most lands share
the following common traits: they are lazy, fearful, and herdlike. The herd quality is already
familiar to the reader of Nietzsche’s Untimely
Meditations not only after the ﬁrst meditation’s
emphasis on popular ediﬁcation and the second
meditation’s bucolic reference to the ahistoricity
and forgetfulness of the herd animal at the start of
On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for
Life, contrasting the animal with the human condition to praise the human being’s distinguishing
excellence and capacity for memory, deﬁning as
“true men, those who are no longer animal, philosophers, artists and saints” (Nietzsche 1983a,
159).
From this perspective, at once conspiratorial
and sympathetic, Nietzsche’s ﬁrst line epitomizes
the famously misanthropic Schopenhauer:
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When the great thinker despises mankind, he
despises their laziness; for it is on account of their
laziness that men seem like factory products, things
of no consequence and unworthy to be associated
with or instructed. (Nietzsche 1983a, 127)

Nietzsche’s familiar tone invites the reader to
suppose himself both like and unlike the “great
thinker.” Thus a more complicated reﬂection on
this essay might highlight a certain contradiction,
Nietzsche seems to take the reader’s side, seeming
to advocate on behalf of anyone who does not
wish to be lumped in with “the herd” Schopenhauer seems to “despise.” “Be yourself!” is the
invitation, with the complicated explanation that
“All you are now thinking, doing, desiring, is not
you yourself” (Ibid).
In what follows Nietzsche invites the “youthful
soul” (and almost every reader is able to respond
to such an invitation, the young and the young at
heart alike) to reﬂect along with him. The scope of
the invitation to the soul is irresistible, promising
“a happiness allotted it from all eternity,” a “happiness,” available to anyone who can break free of
“the chains of fear and convention” (Ibid).
Of all of Nietzsche’s writings, Schopenhauer
as Educator exempliﬁes and justiﬁes David
B. Allison’s striking and beautiful reﬂection in
his preface to Reading the New Nietzsche:
Perhaps more than any other philosopher who readily comes to mind, Nietzsche writes exclusively for
you. Not at you, but for you. For you, the reader,
only you. (Allison 2000, vii)

Note that the titular reference to the ‘New’
echoes Allison’s own earlier book collection
(Allison, ed. 1985). Such a “New Nietzsche” is a
properly “continental” Nietzsche, read together
with, and through, Heidegger, Deleuze, Granier,
Derrida, Birault but also Lingis and one can say,
Allison as well (for a discussion, see: Babich
(2005–2006)). As Allison’s point here suggests,
Nietzsche, as author, gives everything away,
including the reader’s convictions: telling the
reader that everything he or she is or has done or
had lived through, gone through, is not what he or
she is, not really. Instead, the reader’s real or true
self corresponds to his or her “higher” self. Not
only that but Nietzsche tells us that the experience
of true education is and “can only be” liberation.
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This is very exhilarating language.
And Nietzsche does more as he goes on to offer
techniques, real ones, very accurate, very traditional techniques, for what he promises us here: in
search of an educator. Instructively, to do this
Nietzsche describes a memory palace: telling the
reader of his day how to make one and explaining
to the reader the purposes of such a palace, given
the very contemporary, then and now, modern,
all-too-modern project of “ﬁnding oneself.” As
always, if we mean to understand Nietzsche’s
meaning, we cannot dispense with Nietzsche’s
discipline of ancient philology (Classics) but we
also need, more generally, a method of hermeneutic reading, including situating a text in its own
and not less in our own historical context (cf. on
Nietzsche and hermeneutics, Babich 2014).
Thus with explicit reference to the classical
study of education, Nietzsche’s description of
the construction of a memory palace in his Schopenhauer as Educator should be taken together
with Aristotle’s practical philosophy of selfperfection. The method in each case involves
self-examination, meditation, and reﬂection:
Let the youthful soul look back on life with the
question: what have you truly loved up to now,
what has elevated your soul, what has mastered it
and at the same time delighted it? Place these venerated objects before you in a row, and perhaps they
will yield for you, through their nature and their
sequence, a law, the fundamental law of your true
self. Compare these objects, see how one complements, expands, surpasses, transﬁgures another,
how they form a stepladder upon which you have
climbed up to yourself as you are now; for your true
nature lies, not hidden deep within you, but immeasurably high above you, or at least above that which
you normally take to be yourself. (Nietzsche 1983a,
129)

As with any comparison of different aspects,
bracketing prejudices and societal convictions,
the point is to ﬁnd a common aspect that does
not change: this is what mathematicians, physicists, and phenomenologists call the invariant.
The project is classically archaic, the heart of
philosophy, in utter accord with the wisdom of the
Delphic oracle – gnothi seauton (know thyself).
Nietzsche adds to this what he took from Pindar’s
poetic challenge to hold faith with and to be true to
yourself, having learned, both as students begin to
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learn and as educators have learned, who you are,
that is, to say in potentia: what you are capable
of. (I discuss the complexities of Nietzsche’s
motto, as indeed of translating Pindar’s phrase:
Babich 2009.)

Nietzsche’s Ladder
The project in Nietzsche’s meditation is that of
discovery. The treasure chest of the heart is less to
be memorized than sounded out, discovered in its
compass and depth, and a scaffolding to be
constructed not for a descent into the depths of
this treasure chest but for an ascent as we shall see.
Nietzsche’s project in Schopenhauer as Educator
allows the reader to construct a studiosum, a study
chamber of the heart. The result is a guide not to
the arts as such but the self; again, we recall the
method: “Place these venerated objects before
you in a row, and perhaps they will yield for
you, through their nature and their sequence, a
law, the fundamental law of your true self”
(Nietzsche 1983a, 129).
Using the things you love to descry yourself,
you, the reader, are invited to study their relation
to one another. Once again:
Compare these objects, see how one complements,
expands, surpasses, transﬁgures another, how they
form a stepladder upon which you have climbed up
to yourself as you are now; for your true nature lies,
not hidden deep within you, but immeasurably high
above you, or at least above that which you normally take to be yourself. (Ibid)

Education is a triumph of emancipation or liberation. Thus Nietzsche’s comparative phenomenology of the heart reveals not only an inner ideal
but a progress, inasmuch as the self-searching
“youthful soul” already stands and leans on them
in order to have attained the vantage point already
attained.
Here there is a turn around, a reversal. For what
one discovers is just and only that one cannot be
educated. This means that the point of seeking an
educator brings one face-to-face with this same
ineducability. In consequence, one does not need
educators for the sake of education as much as one
needs them to “free one” from education:
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Your true educators and formative teachers reveal to
you what the real raw material of your being is,
something quite ineducable, yet in any case accessible only with difﬁculty, bound, paralyzed: your
educators can be only your liberators. (Ibid)

This ideal echoes Nietzsche’s great sympathy
for both Baruch Spinoza and Blaise Pascal, and it
hints at what he ultimately believes will be the
grace or “light of art”:
it is the perfecting of nature when it prevents her
cruel and merciless attacks and turns them to good,
when it draws a veil over the expressions of nature’s
stepmotherly disposition and her sad lack of understanding. (Ibid)

In this way Nietzsche discovers or “ﬁnds”
himself as he reads, as he writes, Schopenhauer
as Educator.
Telling his own story to himself in this way,
Nietzsche suggests that before ﬁnding Schopenhauer, he engaged in a kind of educational “cruising,” as Tracy B. Strong is calculatedly fond of
this risqué and deliberately erotic language.
(Tracy Strong varies Nietzsche’s sampling selection of different philosophical offerings – “I tried
this one and that one” (Nietzsche 1983a, 133) – in
(Strong 2000, xxx).) By contrast, with this more
modern invocation, Nietzsche’s exemplar is deliberately antique: it is Pindar’s you are to, you ought
to, you should become the one you are. (For a
discussion, see Pindar (and Alexander Nehamas)
in Babich 2009.)
In connection with Augustine’s own Confessions and Pierre Courcelle’s hermeneutic
re-reading of those confessions as related in Pierre
Hadot’s Philosophy as a Way of Life which
reﬂects on the same charms and the same dangers
(see, again, the ﬁrst chapter of Hadot 1995), the
seductiveness of Nietzsche’s confessional expression obscures the urgency of the task Nietzsche
sets for himself at the start of his call to teach at the
University of Basel in Switzerland. Owing to this
urgency, Nietzsche titled his meditations
Untimely. Thus Nietzsche challenged his own
educational institutions much as Ivan Illich likewise challenged education in his book,
Deschooling Society. Illich’s parallel is a complex
one, but his point (which Illich also argues to
illustrate the role school plays as an instrument

of globalization) is offered on the backdrop of
cooption and cultural imperialism especially as
this is evident in underdeveloped countries but
which can also be seen at any level in society,
especially in the contrast between high and low.
As Illich notes in his own context which focuses
on the former: “With very rare exceptions, the
university graduate from a poor country feels
more comfortable with his North American and
European colleagues than with his non-schooled
compatriots, and all students are academically
processed to be happy only in the company of
fellow consumers of the products of the educational machine” (Illich 2000, 34).)
Nietzsche outlines the disparity of the scholar’s
vocation in pedagogic practice as opposed to the
ideal which he takes to a reﬂection on the differences between one scholarly expert and another,
not unlike the reﬂections Max Weber will later
offer with respect to both science (Wissenschaft)
and politics as vocation.
Nietzsche argued in his Untimely Meditations
and overall that the great majority of scholars
could be compared to machines churning automatically, eager to toe the latest trend and unwilling to question much less to offer a critique,
anxious to avoid rocking the boat and so to risk
being disturbed in their path to conventional security. Thus Nietzsche reﬂected on the scholar in
terms of the dryness of his element, the dust of
books, the “grayness” of their thinking.
In his inaugural lecture, Nietzsche had argued
that claims to expertise were founded on nothing
other than scholarly taste, in other words, sheer
personal judgment or mere convention. As Nietzsche went on to argue in a related passage in
Schopenhauer as Educator, such conventions
offer a hiding place for both the narrowly competent and the incompetent in addition to the malformed, adding that once decadence begins in our
educational institutions, it can only grow.
The parallel instantiation Nietzsche draws
upon varies Augustine’s voice of the friend,
angel, or messenger: tolle lege, take and read. To
this extent the account that we have from Nietzsche of his discovery of Schopenhauer’s books in
a bookshop gives us a similarly parallel Augustinian atmosphere. No ﬁg tree, to be sure (thus the
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relevance of Courcelle’s challenge to the literality
of Augustine’s related facts of Augustine’s life in
his Confessions), no word from a nearby angel,
Nietzsche was very literally surrounded by books,
trying this one and that.
For Nietzsche, as for Allison who tells us how
to read Nietzsche, what is telling is a spiritual,
affective, and intimate connection with an author,
Schopenhauer, who wrote as if what he wrote
were directly addressed, in this case, to Nietzsche
himself as reader. It was, Nietzsche tells us, seemingly embarrassed by the audacity of the claim,
however “foolish and immodest a way of putting
it, as though it were for me he had written”
(1983a, 133).
The personal afﬁnity worked only because by
contrast with David Strauss, “confessor” and
“writer,” Schopenhauer’s style was exactly not
popular. Schopenhauer’s style is not that of the
Strunk and White variety or the sort of style US
writing clinics might counsel for today’s undergraduates, “writing across the curriculum,” or the
sort of journalistic inoffensiveness that might permit one to write a novel or a screenplay for the
next television miniseries. In other words, Schopenhauer, who took extraordinary care with his
writing, did not write in a way that would have
guaranteed literary or scholarly fame, and accordingly Schopenhauer never attained market success as a classic. Thus what Nietzsche found
exemplary was less Schopenhauer’s writerly success or fame, much less his timeliness, than that
Schopenhauer wrote for himself. Nietzsche could
thus characterize Schopenhauer’s speciﬁcally
nonstylized stylization or artless artfulness, saying that “Schopenhauer never wants to cut a [rhetorical] ﬁgure: for he writes for himself. . .”
(Nietzsche 1983a). The intimate vocative address,
as Nietzsche writes on the educator he found for
himself, in his own encounter not with the man
but with his writings, calls to the reader as if, as
though, no one else were intended apart from the
reader.
I mentioned the contrast with Strauss, but note
again that the point can easily be overlooked if
one has not ﬁrst read Nietzsche’s David Strauss,
the Confessor and the Writer, the ﬁrst of the
Untimely Meditations. We recall that Nietzsche
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criticizes Strauss in terms of his philology and
owing to his conspicuously writerly his style,
that is, “as a writer recognized as a classic”
(Nietzsche 1983b, 37). This assessment provokes
Nietzsche’s ire, but what is instructive is that
Nietzsche makes the point with reference to German education and not less to the public conﬁdence in its enduring value. This conﬁdence:
seriously convinced of the superiority of all German
educational institutions, especially the grammar
schools and universities, never ceases to recommend them to foreigners as models, and does not
doubt for a moment that they have made the German people into the most educated and judicious
nation in the world. (Ibid)

The focus here is on what Nietzsche calls the
philistine and the philistine’s ideal, by contrast
with Strauss’ Schopenhauer. As Nietzsche writes
in his essay on Schopenhauer, the difference
between them is far from neutral: “Of all the
offence Schopenhauer has given to numerous
scholars, nothing has offended them more than
the unfortunate fact that he does not resemble
them” (Nietzsche 1983a, 182).
Here Nietzsche is quite conspicuously challenging extant university education, reﬂecting
ﬁrst on the oddity of paying people to practice
an ancient tradition, philosophy, which was
deﬁned precisely in its opposition to payment.
Historically, Nietzsche recalls, “the sages of
ancient Greece were not paid by the state but at
most were, like Zeno, honored with a gold crown
and a monument in the Ceramicus” (Ibid 184). As
Nietzsche argued in his reﬂections on the forces
that drive what he called misemployed and appropriated culture, the greed of the money-makers
(Ibid 164) inevitably leads to the institutionalization of education as a commercial industry:
as much knowledge and education as possible,
therefore as much demand as possible, therefore as
much production as possible – that is the seductive
formula. (Ibid, 164)

Indeed nothing could be more timely in our
own time’s than Nietzsche’s reﬂection, the growing acceleration of education:
A speedy education so that one may quickly
money-earning being, yet at the same time an education sufﬁciently thorough to enable one to earn a
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very great deal of money. A man is allowed only as
much as it is in the interest of general moneymaking and world commerce he should possess,
but this amount is also demanded of him. (Ibid, 165)

Nietzsche adds a note on the implausibility of a
professor as a civil servant, of in fact realizing “to
the full the whole gamut of duties and limitations
imposed upon him” (185), but also the sheer
improbability of making appointments of excellence to such salaried posts to begin with. Nietzsche argues that this presupposes the real
competence or at least “the appearance of being
able to distinguish between good philosophers
and bad ones and, even worse, it presupposes
that there must always be a sufﬁciency of good
philosophers to ﬁll all its academic chairs” (185).
Here the point is not only about assessing value,
good and bad quality, but the role of any given
authority, in this case the state, to make just distinctions. Nietzsche continues his reading of the
role of university philosophy and concludes that it
is as if the goal were to require instruction in
philosophy, and Nietzsche uses language that echoes in Illich’s Deschooling Society (2000), to the
point that one might wonder about Nietzsche’s
likely inﬂuence on Illich, as Nietzsche observes
that university schooling compels the educators as
much as the educated:
to reside in a certain place, to live among certain
people, to undertake a certain activity: they are
obliged to instruct every academic youth who
desires instruction, and to do so daily at certain
ﬁxed hours. (1983a, 186)

For Nietzsche the project cannot succeed
because it assigns the imparting of wisdom on
demand, and supposes that one have, just at
those hours, wisdom to impart, never mind that
it also assumes interest on the part of the student
just then, just when. For Nietzsche:
the only critique of a philosophy that is possible and
that proves something, namely trying to see
whether one can live in accordance with it, has
never been taught at universities: all that has been
taught is a critique of words by means of other
words. (1983a, 187)

Nietzsche considered the effect of this, magniﬁed in a curriculum, on “a youthful head, not very
experienced in living” and concludes “what a

desert, what a return to barbarism, what a mockery
of an education in philosophy” (Ibid). Here Nietzsche cannot refrain from concluding that maybe
this result is exactly desired: “education in philosophy only a means of deterring from philosophy”
(Ibid). And so on.
Thus written by our own educator: this is
Nietzsche as we encounter him not as a contemporary but, and just, through his writings. In this
way, it can make all the difference that we tend to
skip Nietzsche’s original educators; thus we miss
the second century AD Lucian who wrote the
satirical dialogues Philosophies for Sale and The
Dead Come to Life or the Fisherman. And we
tend to forget Pindar and Archilochus in addition
to, as both Thomas Brobjer and Jonathan Barnes
have written, on the relevance of the same likewise second century, Diogenes Laertius in whose
writings Nietzsche specialized, telling us that he
prefers reading such ancient commentators to contemporary philosophical commentary, ergo
choosing Diogenes Laertius above the Tübingen
historian, Eduard Zeller, “because the former at
least breathes the spirit of the philosophers of
antiquity, while the latter breathes neither than
nor any other spirit” (1983a, 186).
We always also need to raise questions about
Nietzsche’s ﬁrst book and his investigation of the
presumptions and presuppositions of his own discipline of classics with respect to the “Homer
question” and even more with respect to his concern with ancient Greek music drama or tragedy
and lyric poetry.
If we “knowers” do not know ourselves, as
Nietzsche suggests, it is ﬁrst of all because we do
not seek ourselves. (The term in On the Genealogy
of Morality, Nietzsche’s polemical follow-up to
Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy
of the Future, is wir Erkennenden. Cf. Nietzsche
1967, 15.) It is for this reason that we need genealogical, philological, historical hermeneutic
thinking.
Reﬂecting on acquiring an educator, reﬂecting
on the pursuit of education or what the French call
formation (the German term is Bildung), Nietzsche details an array of difﬁculties involved in
coming to know ourselves. Thus we began by
emphasizing his mnemonic art as a practical
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hermeneutic phenomenology of the self; a spiritual exercise that must animate all learning and
therewith any chance of ﬁnding ourselves. We
turned to a reﬂection on our choice of exemplar
in order to climb Nietzsche’s “ladder” to ascend
our “own true selves,” always highly personal, but
always also in the context of a culture that has
always already taken over education as an institution and a prescription, as Nietzsche invites us to
recall at least a modicum of that condition of
liberty in which Greek philosophy developed:
“freedom: that wonderful and perilous element
in which the Greek philosophers were able to
grow up” (1983a, 182). At the end of his essay,
Nietzsche invokes the signal characteristic of the
philosopher in his capacity to “unhinge” us, to
disturb us. This is, and can only be, liberation.
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